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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENE W. MOWER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs 
ETTA BOHMKE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 8826 
The only facts pertinent to this appeal are in connection 
with the Sheriff's Sale of that certain real property known 
as 981 Lincoln Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, to satisfy Re-
spondent's judgment against Appellant, which had stood for 
almost eight years at the time of said Sheriff's Sale. 
There appears to be no dispute on the facts in regard 
to the Sheriff performing the necessary acts required in such 
sales under Rule 69 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, at 
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2 
least up to the time of the requested postponement of the 
sale, on or about May 20, 1957. 
The postponement of the sale was at the special instance 
and request of both the Sheriff of Salt Lake County and the 
Counsel for Appellant, Etta Bohmke, and was reluctantly 
(R. 72, 75) agreed to by Gay len S. Young, Jr., (R. 59, 60, 
72) associate counsel for Respondent, upon the express 
condition that the Sheriff would postpone from day to day 
in accordance with Utah law without the necessity of Re-
spondent incurring further delays and expenses in having to 
re-advertise or re-notice the sale (R. 72), and upon the 
further condition and stipulation of counsel for Appellant 
that they waive any rights to re-advertisement or re-notice on 
the sale by reason of said postponement (R. 72, 75). 
It was understood by both the Sheriff and counsel for 
Appellant that the postponement, as requested by them, was 
to take place for the purpose of awaiting the return of Gaylen 
S. Young, Sr., which was understood wouldn't be for about 
ten days time (R. 61, 72, 84). 
Sheriff Holley cried the postponement of the sale from 
day to day until June 4, 1957, on which date the property 
was sold. The facts further show that Gay len S. Young, Sr. 
returned to Salt Lake City near the end of May, 1957, and 
attempted to contact by phone Appellant's attorney, leaving 
word for him to call back on two or three occasions, and 
thereafter, since no word was heard, or offers received from 
Appellant or her attorney, the Sheriff finally went ahead with 
the sale on June 4, 1957 (R. 84, 85, 80). 
The facts seem to be in conflict as to whether there was 
supposed to be some further agreement between the respective 
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counsel as to a future date for the Sheriff's Sale ( R. 84), 
but it is clear that counsel for Appellant was notified of the 
actual sale before it took place and that he made no effort 
whatsoever to object or further postpone the same 
(R. 74, 75). 
The facts further show that neither Appellant, nor her 
counsel, James Barker, Jr., made any objection or raised 
any question as to notice after the sale had taken place, but 
that after James Barker, Jr. had withdrawn as Appellant's 
counsel, Appellant, with new counsel, files a motion to set 
aside the sale which had taken place more than 6 months 
previous, and after Respondent's judgment had expired. 
Appellant's attorney refers to "The obvious and glaring 
failure to comply with required procedures prescribed for 
execution sales," but there are no facts to support this state-
ment. True, there was an error made by the Sheriff's office 
in recording the proper date, but no argument is made by 
counsel on this matter, so no further facts or arguments will 
be stated by counsel in this Brief. 
As to the "Declaration of Homestead," filed by Ap-
pellant, the facts are clear that there is no claim, nor 
showing on the declaration itself, that Mrs. Bohmke is a 
"Head of a family" (R. 70, Exhibit D-1). 
It is, therefore, Respondent's position that Appellant's 
motion and appeal is not well taken, that the Sheriff acted 
according to law in said Sheriff's Sale, that proper and 
due notice was given, and that Appellant should be estopped 
now in raising any question as to lack of notice in an attempt 
to void said sale. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
PROPER NOTICE WAS GIVEN JUDGMENT 
DEBTOR OF SHERIFF'S SALE. 
POINT II 
ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN TO 
HOMESTEAD RIGHTS, AND THERE WAS NOT A 
PROPER DECLARATION ON FILE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PROPER NOTICE WAS GIVEN JUDGMENT 
DEBTOR OF SHERIFF'S SALE. 
It must be kept in mind that the only real question 
raised by Appellant in this appeal is whether the Sheriff's 
Sale can be declared void by reason of the postponement 
of said sale and the amount of notice that was given before 
the actual sale took place. Since this is apparently the only 
real issue, it must be borne in mind that the postponement 
of the sale was clearly brought about and promoted through 
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Appellant's counsel, James Barker, Jr. (R. 59) and then 
specifically requested of Respondent's counsel through 
Sheriff Holley and James Barker, Jr., as was testified to by 
both Sheriff Holley and James Barker, Jr. (R. 59, 60, 72). 
Further it was specifically agreed and stipulated by said 
counsel for Appellant that they were waiving any rights 
they might have to further re-advertisement or re-notice on the 
sale by reason of the postponement. This was made a condi-
tion, clearly for the reason that Gaylen S. Young, Sr. was 
out of town and was not expected back for about ten days, 
and because the statute on postponement of a Sheriff's Sale 
was not absolutely clear as to the length of time for a post-
ponement without additional notice. Appellant's own coun-
sel testified at the hearing as follows: 
"Harry Holley said he wanted to settle it, and I 
thought Gaylen Young, Jr. would be amenable to 
postponing the sale and I called him up. He said he 
would be agreeable to setting the sale over until his 
father got back. He was worried about posting notice, 
and he didn't want to go through the expense of post-
ing notice. I said if he agreed to postpone, and if 
the homestead matter fell through, I would withdraw 
as attorney and we would agree to the date, and the 
sale take place, and we had had notice and no new 
notices needed to be posted, and he said under those 
circumstances it was agreeable to postpone the sale, 
and we agreed both would call Harry Holley, stating 
that is the agreement." (See Record Page 72) 
It certainly appears to counsel for Respondent that 
Appellant, after waiting more than six months from the 
actual sale date, after Respondent's judgment had expired, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
and after acquiring new counsel, is out of order in prosecut-
ing this appeal on this ground. It is Respondent's position, 
therefore, that even if Appellant's argument were sound, 
which we claim it is not, Appellant has waived her rights 
to additional notice and should be estopped from asserting 
that the lack of such notice makes the said Sheriff's Sale 
void. Respondent is supported by the law in this matter 
as shown in 21 American Jurisprudence-Executions-Sec-
tions 186, 187, and 195. Section 195 on "Waiver and 
Estoppel" is quoted as follows: 
"Notice of an execution sale is primarily for 
the benefit of the defendant, who may waive his right 
to object to the lack of it or to irregularities connected 
therewith, at least where there are no liens on the 
property. Moreover, the objection will be considered 
as waived unless made within a reasonable time by 
the defendant in execution or by some person who 
has been prejudiced." (See also 31 American Juris-
prudence-Judicial Sales-Section 261). 
Again in 21 American Jurisprudence-Executions-
Section 196, Page l 00 it states: 
"An execution sale at a time other than that 
prescribed by law has been held not to render the sale 
void, but to be a mere irregularity which may be 
waived by the execution debtor ... " 
It is Respondent's contention, however, that the sale 
did take place as prescribed by law and that due and sea-
sonable notice was given. Notice was properly given of the 
sale as prescribed by statute to the time of postponement, 
which is not denied, then during the postponement period the 
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Sheriff cried the postponement of the sale, each day, from 
day to day, and in addition contacted, personally, Appellant's 
counsel before the sale, after all reasonable efforts had 
been made by Respondent's counsel to do so. Counsel, in 
Appellant's brief, makes a point of the fact (which is in 
dispute) that some definite sale date would have to be 
agreed upon by the parties before the Sheriff's Sale could 
take place. This would appear to be quite out of reason, 
for that would have left it in the hands of Appellant to delay 
at will the sale date for an indefinite length of time. The 
whole spirit and intent of the postponement was to await 
the return of Gaylen S. Young, Sr., who had been handling 
the case for Respondent, to confer with them on an offer that 
was supposed to be presented, or forthcoming from Appel-
lant, (which offer was never in fact made) and then the 
sale to be conducted. (SeeR. 59, 60, 61, 72, 75, 83, 84, 85). 
However, the fact that Appellant's counsel did not return the 
calls made to his office, and the fact that no objection what-
soever was made to the Sheriff going ahead with the sale 
after personal contact was made, indicates that Appellant did 
agree to the sale taking place on June 4, 1957, and cannot 
now object to any lack of notice. The fact, also, that all 
attempts to come to some agreement between the parties had 
failed prior to this time, and the fact that an offer, sub-
stantially the same as that which James Barker, Jr. testified 
was agreeable with Appellant at the time of the request for 
the postponement, was made by Respondent to Appellant 
after the sale was consummated, but again refused, (R. 77), 
leads one to believe that Appellant was not seriously con-
sidering making any offer to Respondent, and Respondent 
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was certainly justified in having the sale take place after 
making reasonable efforts to contact Appellant. 
Under these circumstances counsel for Appellant cannot 
claim that the notice of postponement was substantially 
misleading, erroneous, or insufficient or that due and 
seasonable notice of time and place of adjournment was not 
giVen. 
In 31 American Jurisprudence--Judicial Sales-Sec· 
tion 79, it states as follows: 
"The weight of authority apparently supports 
the view that a notice of adjournment of a sale, which 
has been in all respects regularly advertised, is suf-
ficient if made in good faith, and if reasonably cal-
culated to give proper publicity as to time and place. 
Reasonable effort to prevent a sacrifice of the 
property is all that is necessary, the sufficiency of a 
notice depending largely on the particular facts of the 
case wherein it was given. Personal service of the 
notice is not necessary, it may in a proper case, he 
given by publication in a newspaper, or by proclama-
tion." (See also 31 American Jurisprudence--
Judicial Sales-Section 80, and 37 American Juris-
prudence~Mortgages-Section 613). 
Counsel is not aware of any Utah law interpreting the 
statute on "Postponement" as set out in Rule 69 (e) ( 2) of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but it is clear that the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Office has postponed sales in the 
past, and it has been their custom to postpone from day to 
day and not have to re-advertise or re-notice the sale. That 
is what Sheriff Holley informed counsel for Respondent on 
at the time of the request for postponement and how he 
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testified at the hearing in this matter ( R. 54). We submit 
that under the statute the Sheriff may, on his own, if he 
deems it expedient, postpone the sale. He deemed it expe-
dient in this case, and did it in the manner to which he had 
been accustomed. Such custom should be a factor in con-
sidering what the Legislature had intended on such post-
ponements. The statute also indicates that the officer "may 
postpone the same from time to time, until the same shall 
be completed," indicating, it seems, that several days were 
contemplated, because the statute goes on to say what kind 
of notice is needed in that event, to-wit, only a proclamation, 
for it states, "and in every such case he shall make public 
declaration thereof at the time and place previously appointed 
for the sale." The only restriction on this type of notice, 
then, was in case the officer postponed the sale for a longer 
period than a day. In the case at bar, Sheriff Holley post-
poned by public proclamation for a day at a time, clearly 
within the spirit and meaning of the statute. In 21 American 
Jurisprudence, Section 242, Page 123, it states. 
"Execution sales are not scrutinized by the courts 
with a view to defeat them. On the contrary, every 
reasonable intendment will be made in their favor so 
as to secure, if such can be done consistently with 
legal rules, the object they were intended to ac-
complish." 
Where an officer is exercising due diligence and acts 
m good faith and with an honest intention to perform his 
duty, he should be given some latitude of discretion, and 
where it is within reason to do so, we submit that his acts 
should be upheld by the courts. (See Williams vs. Conti-
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nental Securities Corporation, 153 P 2nd 852, also 31 
American Jurisprudence-Judicial Sales-Section 42.) 
There is another factor to be considered in this matter, 
and that is, if the acts of the Sheriff in this sale render the 
sale void for the reasons stated by opposing counsel, then 
surely it would place a cloud on the title of all other real 
property where the Sheriff has performed in a similar 
fashion. 
It is not clear whether Sheriff Holley postponed the 
sale from one business day to the next, where Sundays or 
holidays intervened, or whether the proclamation was actually 
made on said Sundays and holiday; however, in either event, 
counsel for Respondent is of the opinion that there would 
be no violation of the meaning of the statute which would 
require re-advertisement or re-notice as originally given. 
In the 1953 Utah Code the word "day" is used rather 
than "twenty-four hours," as used in the 1943 Utah Code at 
104-37-20. This apparently was the only change made 
when this section was repealed by laws 1951, Ch. 58, Sec. 3. 
No doubt the Legislature had in mind the postponement 
from one business day to the next as is also contemplated 
in the statute pertaining to "time" found in Rule 6 (a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A "day" by this rule 
does not include Sundays or holidays. So if the Sheriff 
postponed the sale from one business day to the next, we 
submit that he was within "one day'' as contemplated by 
the statute. 
However, if the proclamation was made on a Sunday 
or a holiday by the Sheriff, postponing the sale to the next 
day, again, we submit that it would not render the sale 
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illegal and void as argued by counsel for Appellant. Section 
78-7-8 Utah Code Annotated 1953 does indicate that the 
courts are not open, nor can judicial business be transacted 
on Sunday and legal holidays, with certain exceptions, 
among, which, however, are "executions"; but there is no 
mention of making such acts void. It merely indicates that 
where such business does fall upon said days, " it is deemed 
appointed for, or adjourned to, the next day." It is further 
Respondent's contention that a Sheriff's sale is not a 
"judicial act" or "judicial business" that comes within the 
meaning of this statute. (See 58 ALR, 1273; also White vs. 
Zust 28 N. J. Eq 107 and cited in the annotation 58 ALR 
at Page 1275.) 
Again it is submitted that the consideration and interpre-
tation to be given in this case should be that most favorable 
to upholding said Sheriff's sale as valid. 
POINT II 
ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN TO 
HOMESTEAD RIGHTS, AND THERE WAS NOT A 
PROPER DECLARATION ON FILE. 
Since counsel cited no cases to support this ground of 
Appellant's appeal and has made only a passing statement 
concerning it, we assume he is not serious on this point. 
Even in the case where there is a homestead right, it is 
clear in the law that the judgment creditor may have execu-
tion against the homestead and may have the same sold, 
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where the homestead exceeds in value the exemption. See 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, 28-1-15 and Notes; 28-1-2; 
28-1-14; and Giesy-Walker Co. vs. Briggs, 162 P 876. 
In the instant case it is clear that the value of the real 
property far exceeds the homestead exemption claim (Exhibit 
D-1), and therefore we submit that the Sheriff's sale of said 
property is not void. This would also he the case, even if a 
proper homestead declaration were on file. However, it 
is Respondent's contention that the homestead declaration 
filed by Appellant is of no force or effect, and is null and 
void. 
The law requires under 28-1-10 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as follows: 
"The homestead must he selected and claimed 
by the homestead claimant by making, signing and 
acknowledging a declaration of homestead as pro-
vided in section 28-1-11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
which declaration must, before the time stated in the 
notice of sale on execution, or on other judicial sale, 
as the time of sale, of premises in which the home-
stead is claimed, he delivered to and served upon the 
sheriff or other officer conducting the sale or re-
corded as provided in section 28-1-12, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. If no such claim is filed or served 
as herein provided, title shall pass to the purchaser at 
such sale free and clear of all homestead rights." 
Also 28-1-11 of the said Code requires the following: 
"The declaration of homestead must contain: 
( 1) A statement showing the person making it 
to be the head of a family, or, when the declaration 
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is made by the wife, showing that her husband has 
not made such declaration. 
( 2) A description of the premises. 
( 3) An estimate of their cash value." 
It is undisputed from the facts that Appellant's Decla-
ration does not contain a statement showing her to be the 
"head of a family," and therefore, Appellant has not made 
a claim as provided by 28-1-11. Consequently, title to the 
real property passed to the purchaser at the Sheriff's sale 
free and clear of all homestead rights as indicated in 28-1-10 
of said Code. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the view held by 
the District Court is the proper one and that the appeal 
should be dismissed and the judgment of the District Court 
should be affirmed with costs to Respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
YOUNG & YOUNG 
Gaylen S. Young 
Gaylen S. Young, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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